Zur Herausgabepflicht des ISP-Providers nach US-Recht
Nach United States v. Warshak (U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit; 08-3997 vom 14.12.2010), et al. dürfen die Strafbehörden einen Internet Service Provider nur dann zur Herausgabe der eMails eines Beschuldigten verpflichten, wenn sie einen Durchsuchungsbefehl vorweisen können. Der Kunde des ISP darf selbst dann auf die Vertraulichkeit des eMail-Verkehrs vertrauen, wenn die Vertraulichkeit gegenüber dem ISP vertraglich beschränkt ist:
If we accept that an email is analogous to a letter or a phone call, it is manifest that agents of the government cannot compel a commercial ISP to turn over the contents of an email without triggering the Fourth Amendment. An ISP is the intermediary that makes email communication possible. Emails must pass through an ISP’s servers to reach their intended recipient. Thus, the ISP is the functional equivalent of a post office or a telephone company. As we have discussed above, the police may not storm the post office and intercept a letter, and they are likewise forbidden from using the phone system to make a clandestine recording of a telephone call—unless they get a warrant, that is. See Jacobsen, 466 U.S. at 114; Katz, 389 U.S. at 353. It only stands to reason that, if government agents compel an ISP to surrender the contents of a subscriber’s emails, those agents have thereby conducted a Fourth Amendment search, which necessitates compliance with the warrant requirement absent some exception (p. 20).…As an initial matter, it must be observed that the mere ability of a third-party intermediary to access the contents of a communication cannot be sufficient to extinguish a reasonable expectation of privacy. In Katz, the Supreme Court found it reasonable to expect privacy during a telephone call despite the ability of an operator to listen in. See Smith, 442 U.S. at 746-47 (Stewart, J., dissenting). Similarly, the ability of a rogue mail handler to rip open a letter does not make it unreasonable to assume that sealed mail will remain private on its journey across the country. Therefore, the threat or possibility of access is not decisive when it comes to the reasonableness of an expectation of privacy (p. 21).
Das Gericht hat übrigens nicht auf ein Verwertungsverbot geschlossen, weil die Strafverfolger gutgläubig nach einem (nun 184-106-235-187.static.cloud-ips.com teilweise verfassungswidrig erkannten) Bundesgesetz gehandelt hatten.
Wie wäre die Frage nach CH-Recht zu beantworten?